PUNISHMENT AND SATISFACTION IN
AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF THE ATONEMENT:
A REPLY TO STUMP
Nikolaus Breiner

According to Eleonore Stump, Thomas Aquinas rejects a “popular” (roughly,
penal substitutionary) account of the atonement. For Stump’s Aquinas, God
does not require satisfaction or punishment for human sin, and the function
of satisfaction is remedial, not juridical or penal. Naturally, then, Aquinas
does not, on this reading, see Christ’s passion as having saving effect in virtue
of Christ substitutionally bearing the punishment for human sin that divine
justice requires. I argue that Stump is incorrect. For Aquinas, divine justice
does require satisfaction; satisfaction involves punishment ( poena) and has a
penal function; and one way Christ’s death has saving effect is in virtue of his
satisfying that requirement on people’s behalf. Christ saves by “paying our
debt,” bearing in the place of humans the penalty or punishment required
by divine justice. My argument implies that Aquinas’s account of satisfaction
in the atonement significantly resembles key aspects of Stump’s “popular account”—and of the Penal Substitution Theory it represents.

Introduction
In her presentation of Thomas Aquinas’s account of the atonement,
Eleonore Stump contrasts Aquinas’s account with a “popular account”
of the atonement. According to that popular account, Christ’s death has
saving effect in virtue of his bearing for sinners, in their place, the penalty
of punishment for sin that God, in his justice, required.1 Though Stump

Stump, Aquinas, chap. 15. Stump defines the “popular account” as follows:
Human beings by their evil actions have offended God. This sin or offense against
God generates a kind of debt, a debt so enormous that human beings by themselves can never repay it. God has the power, of course, to cancel this debt, but
God is perfectly just, and it would be a violation of perfect justice to cancel a debt
without extracting the payment owed. Therefore, God cannot simply forgive a
person’s sin; as a just judge he must sentence all people to everlasting torment as
the just punishment for their sin. God is also infinitely merciful, however; and so
he brings it about that he himself pays their debt in full, by assuming human nature as the incarnate Christ and in that nature enduring the penalty which would
otherwise have been imposed on human beings. In consequence, the sins of ordi-
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admits that Aquinas’s account of the atonement sometimes sounds similar
to this popular account, she claims that the similarity is only “superficial;”
according to Stump, the two accounts are actually completely different.2
As I show in Section I, Stump makes three claims about Aquinas’s account to substantiate her claim that Aquinas and the popular account do
not agree. Those claims are the following:
S1) For Aquinas, God does not require satisfaction for the remission of
human sin;
S2) For Aquinas, the aim of satisfaction is remedial, and not juridical;
its aim is to restore love in the wrong-doer’s will, rather than to
fulfill a requirement of justice;
S3) For Aquinas, Christ’s death, as a work of satisfaction, functions in
virtue of Christ serving as a template of love and obedience (one
which elicits our love), rather than in virtue of his fulfilling a requirement on our behalf by bearing our punishment.
As Stump contends throughout her exposition of Aquinas’s account, S1–S3
set Aquinas’s account of the atonement off from the so-called popular account of the atonement.
After briefly noting in Section II the fact that others agree with Stump’s
reading and that Stump’s popular account is more or less a cipher for a
Penal Substitution Theory (PST) of the atonement,3 I argue in Sections III–
VI that Stump’s interpretation is incorrect; Aquinas, in fact, affirms each of
the three notions Stump takes him to deny. That is, I argue that:
A1) For Aquinas, divine justice (based on the divine will) requires satisfaction for the remission of sin.
A2) For Aquinas, satisfaction has a juridical function: it involves undergoing punishment for sin required by divine justice, a requirement
“satisfied” by the undergoing of that punishment.
A3) For Aquinas, one way in which Christ’s death has saving effect
is that he bears the punishment required by justice for us, in our
place, thereby freeing us from our debt of punishment.
In Section VII, I observe that A1–A3 undermine Stump’s attempt to mark
Aquinas account off from the popular account and the Penal Substitution
Theory it tends to represent. In fact, A1–A3 show that Aquinas’s account
of the Christ’s death, in its function as a work of satisfaction, substantially
resembles a PST—though, as I concede, a more definitive statement about
nary human beings are forgiven; and, by God’s mercy exercised through Christ’s
passion, human beings are saved from sin and hell and brought to heaven. (427)
2
Stump, Aquinas, 440.
3
See Section II, especially footnote 26, for discussion of the relation of the popular account
to PST.
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the relation of Aquinas’s account to PST requires a separate and rigorous
consideration.4
To be clear at the outset, note the following: my argument for A1–A3
against Stump’s S1–S3 does not form an objection to Stump’s helpful
treatment of the other positive functions of Christ’s death in Aquinas’s
account. Indeed, Aquinas’s multifaceted account, with its numerous benefits and modes of efficacy—which Stump helpfully conveys—make that
ill-advised.5 Rather, my dispute is restricted to Stump’s denials: i.e., to her
claim that Aquinas does not, in contradistinction to the “popular account,”
think that Christ’s atonement functions in virtue of Christ’s bearing in
humanity’s place the punishments required by God’s justice. I argue that
Aquinas does admit this as one of the atonement’s many functions.
I. Stump’s Reading of Aquinas on the Atonement
In her exposition of Aquinas’s account (which doubles as a case for differentiating Aquinas’s from the popular account of the atonement) Stump’s
first key claim is that, unlike the popular account which sees God as constrained by his justice to punish sin unless satisfaction be made, Aquinas
holds that God does not require satisfaction for human sin.6 (Note: Stump
does not explicitly define satisfaction, but she seems to understand it as
the act of offering “compensatory payment” or of “making restitution” for
the injury one has caused another. So, for example, if a boy trampled his
mother’s flower garden, satisfaction could consist in repairing the flower
bed to at least its original condition).7 In support of her contention that, for
Aquinas, God does not require satisfaction, Stump points to Summa Theologiae (ST) III.46.2. There Aquinas argues that God could have delivered
humans without satisfaction, reasoning in the following way:
If God remits sin . . . he does no one an injury, just as any human being who,
without [requiring] satisfaction, remits an offence committed against himself does not act unjustly but is merciful.8

From this text, Stump infers that “it is not necessary that satisfaction be
made for human sins.”9 God does not require it; he is “free . . . to forego it.”10

I take up this task in an essay currently in preparation.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [ST] III.48.1–4 gives four different ways by which Christ’s
death has salvific efficacy.
6
Stump, Aquinas, 431.
7
Stump, Aquinas, 437–438. Stump speaks of “undoing his mischief” and “fixing the
damage.” In some satisfaction theories of the atonement, it may be important to distinguish
between restoring the goods which one has “stolen” or otherwise taken from the victim, and
that of offering some compensation, above and beyond that restoration, to “make up” for
the fact that an injury was caused at all. As far as I can tell, this distinction is not important
to Stump’s account.
8
Stump, Aquinas, 431; ST III.46.2 ad.3.
9
Stump, Aquinas, 431.
10
Stump, Aquinas, 432.
4
5
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The interpretation appears plausible. One could also appeal to Aquinas’s
claims that it was possible for God to have restored human nature with no
incarnation at all—and, presumably, therefore, with no act of satisfaction.11
But if God is not unwaveringly committed to “damn[ing] human
beings unless [satisfaction] be made,” then the problem, Stump claims, is
not on God’s side of the divine-human relationship; instead, the problem
caused by sin lies on the human end, with human nature.12 Thus, since
satisfaction addresses the problem in the divine-human relationship, and
the problem is on “our side,” satisfaction aims at overcoming a problem
or obstacle on the human end of the divine-human relationship.13 And the
specific problem there (at least the one rooted in our past sin) is the fact
that our wills have turned away from God. So Stump’s second major claim
is that the aim of satisfaction is the healing or restoration of love in the wrongdoer’s will.14
This aim of satisfaction can be understood by considering cases of injury
within interpersonal relationships. When one person maliciously wrongs
a friend (or inadvertently wrongs her friend but then feels no remorse for
her act), the friendship is broken in an important way. Whether the goods
taken by the perpetrator are restored to the victim may or may not be necessary for the restoration of the relationship; what is necessary is for love
to be restored in the wrong-doer, for the will of the wrong-doer to turn back
to her friend in love, since that mutual love is an important, constitutive
ingredient of that friendship. Moreover, when one undertakes to undo the
damage she has caused another, her will may be transformed in this very
undertaking. The external act can help draw out the needed internal state.
And for Stump, this internal change is the point of satisfaction.
To support her claim regarding the function of satisfaction in Aquinas,
Stump points to the fact that satisfaction is part of the sacrament of penance, which, for Aquinas, “aims primarily at the restoration of friendship
between the wrong-doer and the one wronged.”15 She writes, “Aquinas
sees penance in general as a kind of medicine for sin.” She quotes ST III.90
in support: “The detestation of [one’s] past sins belongs to penance, together with the purpose of changing [one’s] life for the better, which is, as
it were, the goal of penance.”16
11
ST III.1.2, an article on “whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race
that the Word of God should become incarnate.”
12

Stump, Aquinas, 432.

13

Stump, Aquinas, 432.

Stump, Aquinas, 432. Stump distinguishes between various problems in the divine-human relationship having to do with sin. There is the problem of “past sin” and
“future sin,” and Christ’s work of satisfaction solves the first.
14

15
“On [the popular account], the problem with the sins a person . . . has committed is that
they have resulted in God’s-alienation from [that person] and in God’s consequent inability
to refrain from punishing him, without satisfactions having been made. But, on Aquinas’s
account, [the sinner] is alienated from God, who is free to require satisfaction or to forego it;
and the problem is a problem in human nature” (Stump, Aquinas, 432).
16

Stump, Aquinas, 432.
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What is especially important for the purpose of my argument is that
Stump thinks that the remedial function of satisfaction excludes or displaces its juridical one, that is, its involving the “payment” of a penalty
that justice requires be paid. Or at least Stump often frames her claim this
way, playing the one function off against the other. The popular account,
with its claims that God requires that satisfaction be made and that punishments be dispensed, envisages God as a kind of cosmic “accountant
keeping double-column books on the universe. When a person commits a
sin, a debt of guilt is registered in one column which must be balanced on
the same line in the other column by the payment of a punishment which
compensates for the guilt.”17 Aquinas’s conception of God, on the other
hand, “is more nearly analogous to a parent than to an accountant.” For
Stump, this kind of good parent is not concerned with “trying to keep the
spiritual books of the household balanced;” rather, “the parent’s concern
is with the child, that the child develop into the best person she can be
and that there be a loving relationship between the child and her parent.”
Consequently, “any punishing, then, is strictly a means to the end of making
the child a good person in harmony with the parent.”18 To return the analogy
to God, “God,” for Stump’s Aquinas, “is not concerned to balance the accounts. He is concerned with the sinner. What he wants is for that person
to love what God loves and to be in harmony with God. His aim, then, is
to turn that person around.”19 So, she contends that for Aquinas, the point
and purpose of satisfaction is “to return the wrongdoer’s will to conformity with the will of the person wronged, rather than to inflict retributive
punishment on the wrongdoer.”20
These two claims—that God does not require satisfaction and that the
aim and function of satisfaction is the restoration of love in the sinner,
rather than the fulfilling of a requirement of justice, say, that sin be penalized or punished—are the basis of how Stump’s Aquinas thinks Christ’s
death functions. Christ’s death is a work of “vicarious satisfaction,”21
a case of one person acting to repair the damages another has caused.
According to Stump, the important concern in vicarious satisfaction (at
least in the context of loving interpersonal relationships) is not repairing
the damages, but rather, repairing the will of the wrong-doer. A person’s
act of vicarious satisfaction can help solve that problem. For insofar as
one “allies” herself with the other who makes satisfaction on her behalf,
17

Stump, Aquinas, 436.

18

Stump, Aquinas, 436. (emphasis mine).

19

Stump, Aquinas, 437.

Stump, Aquinas, 435. Cf. 432 as well: “The function of satisfaction for Aquinas is not to
placate a wrathful God or in some other way remove the constraints which compel God to
damn sinners. Instead, the function of satisfaction is to restore a sinner to a state of harmony
with God by repairing or restoring in the sinner what sin has damaged.” Also, 437: “the aim
of any satisfaction . . . is not to make debts and payments balance but to restore a sinner to
harmony with God.”
20

21

Stump, Aquinas, 434 ff.
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insofar as one sees and feels her substitute’s actions to be a fulfillment
of a restitution she owed, wanted, and needed to provide, then the real
problem of the wrong-doer’s unloving, disharmonious will would be
solved. “On this view, a person making vicarious satisfaction is not providing compensatory payment so much as acting the part of a template
representing the desired character or action, in accordance with which the
sinner can align his own will and inclinations to achieve a state of mind
[i.e., a restored love toward God] which it is at least unlikely” for him to
have achieved apart from the initiative and work of the substitute.22 This
is how Christ’s death functions as a work of satisfaction.
Again, it is Stump’s attendant denial which is important for my argument. She writes the following:
According to Aquinas, God does not require the penalties for sins either
from human beings or from Christ. God does not inflict Christ’s suffering
on Christ as a punishment for human sins; rather God receives it as an act
of making satisfaction whose goal is the alteration of human intellects and
wills.23

Christ does not atone by “[paying] the full penalty for all human sin so
that human beings would not have to pay it.”24 He does not atone by
paying a debt of punishment for humanity that God requires to be paid.
Such are Stump’s three main claims by which she presents Aquinas’s
account, and, at the same time, by which she argues that Aquinas does
not hold (and at places even rejects) the popular account. In what follows,
I argue that each of Stump’s negative claims about Aquinas is incorrect.
II. Framing the Significance of Stump’s Interpretation
Before turning to evaluate the first of Stump’s claims, I offer two brief
observations which frame the significance of her interpretation. First,
Stump’s “popular account” is not merely some popular-level theology of
the “unreflective.”25 Rather, it more or less represents a penal substitutionary theory (PST).26 Both PST and the popular account maintain that
God’s justice requires some penalty or punishment for sin; that Jesus bears
this penalty or punishment on the cross; that he thereby satisfies the requirement of justice for humans, in their stead; and that by so satisfying

22

Stump, Aquinas, 437.

23

Stump, Aquinas, 440.

24

Stump, Aquinas, 428–429.

25

Stump, Aquinas, 427.

Stump’s popular account likely represents not just PST, but also “Anselmian” accounts
of the atonement generally, constituted as such by their holding i) that God has some requirement which must be fulfilled before he will resume fellowship with humans who have
sinned; ii) that the reality of this requirement constitutes a plight for human beings; and iii)
that Christ’s death solves that predicament. PST is seen as a kind of variation on this more
general Anselmian type. It is important to acknowledge that some construals of PST might
not endorse all aspects of the popular account.
26
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the requirement, he delivers humans from their plight, in the manner of
paying their “debt.”
Second, it is important to note that Stump is not alone in her interpretation of Aquinas. Thomistic scholar Romanus Cessario voices a similar
view. After reviewing how Aquinas understands Christ’s death as the
sacrificial offering of a perfectly loving, submissive, humble and obedient
will to God, Cessario concludes:
Aquinas offers no support for those who would advance a theory of penal
substitution as the mechanism by which the benefits of Christ reach the human race. Love, not punishment, dominated Aquinas’s account of the efficacy of the Passion.27

Another interpreter, Rik van Nieuwenhove, also agrees: “It is a gross
misreading” he states, “to understand ‘making satisfaction’ in terms of
retribution and punishment.”28 Like Stump, Van Nieuwenhove not only
thinks Aquinas conceives of satisfaction in personalistic terms rather than
juridical ones, he also appeals to the remedial nature of penance to undermine any penal undertones of satisfaction. Penance “is described as
‘a spiritual healing of a sort’ . . . or as ‘a spiritual medicine,’” and “sin is
called ‘a sickness of the soul.’” “These metaphors reveal . . . a world of
difference: whereas a judge punishes, a doctor heals.”29 Thus, according
not only to Stump, but also to other prominent interpreters, Aquinas understands the function of Christ’s death without reference to a justice that
requires punishment for sin.
In what follows, I will attempt to show that Stump and those who agree
with her on the nature and function of satisfaction, particularly in the
atonement, are reading Aquinas incorrectly.
III. Aquinas on the Necessity of Satisfaction
Stump’s first claim (S1) is a proposed answer to the question of whether
God, for Aquinas, requires satisfaction—that is, of whether God’s justice
requires satisfaction for the remission of sin. Aquinas is surprising clear on
27
Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” 124. It is possible that Cessario’s account
may escape my objections to Stump’s account of Aquinas. Cessario admits what I argue
below: that satisfaction “responds . . . to the needs of the divine justice” (122). (However,
he later says that “this arrangement is not binding on God,” which, as I will argue, seems
inaccurate in an important way). And perhaps his comments about penal substitution have
in view aspects of PST outside the “basic PST” which I see Aquinas as accepting (see Section VII). Finally, perhaps his claim about the place of love and punishment in Aquinas’s
view is merely about Thomistic emphasis. That said, he at least seems to share Stump’s view
in important ways. He suggests that the idea that “salvation is a matter of restitution and
punishment” is a distortion (126). He holds that Aquinas does not present “a vengeful God
who exacts a terrible punishment from an innocent victim” (125). I do not suggest that
Aquinas portrays God as “vengeful;” Aquinas may even think that God does not exact the
punishments that Christ bears. But we must consider separately whether Christ satisfies
a requirement of punishment, bearing our punishments in our place for the sake of that
requirement of divine justice.
28

Van Nieuwenhove, “The Saving Work of Christ,” 439.

29

Van Nieuwenhove, “The Saving Work of Christ,” 439.
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this question. In his Compendium Theologiae (CT), he writes, “If God were
to have restored human beings only by his will and power, the order of
divine justice, which requires satisfaction for sins, would not be observed.”30 He
is especially explicit in Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG): “The order of divine
justice . . . requires that God should not remit sin without satisfaction.”31
How is one to square these texts with ST III.46.2, which Stump (and, to
some extent, Cessario)32 cites in support of the opposite claim that God does
not require satisfaction? ST III.46.2 considers the question of “Whether
there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the
passion of Christ.” And indeed, in that article, Aquinas emphasizes an affirmative answer: there was another way—which is to say that satisfaction
was not necessary. While Aquinas expresses this claim in the body of his
answer (the respondeo), a forceful line of reasoning in support of it is given
in the replies to the objections. Stump cites the reply:
[Reply to Objection 3:] A judge who has to punish a fault committed against
another . . . cannot remit the fault or penalty without injustice. But God has
no one superior to him; rather he himself is the highest and universal good
of the whole world. And for this reason, if [God] remits sin, which is defined
as a fault from its being committed against [God] himself, he does no one an
injury, just as any human being who, without [requiring] satisfaction, remits
an offense committed against himself does not act unjustly but is merciful.33

But, as I will now argue, the passage, read carefully and contextually, does
not suggest what Stump takes it to suggest; it does not suggest that God
“does not require satisfaction” or that God is “free to forego it.”
Consider first the objection to which the passage just mentioned replies:
[Objection 3:] God’s justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion
in order that man might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His
justice pass . . . since He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to
be delivered otherwise than by Christ’s passion.

This objection, and the others that similarly seem to suggest that Christ’s
passion was necessary, meet a strong opposition in the article’s sed contra:
[On the contrary:] Augustine says (De Trin. 13): [While] we assert that the
way whereby God . . . delivered us [namely, Christ’s pasion] . . . is both good

30

Compendium Theologiae [CT] 200, as translated by Regan, 150; emphasis mine.

31

IV.54.9.

On the one hand, Cessario recognizes that in ST III.46.2 Aquinas’s point is that God
could have decided “to free man from sin in some other way than by the sufferings of Christ”
(Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” 122). On the other hand, Cessario also thinks
that in the passage, Aquinas says that “this arrangement is not binding on God.” He sees
Aquinas as “preserving” “the absolute freedom of divine love as it communicates itself in
the world.” However, as I explain below, Aquinas thinks that once God has willed, the matter
becomes necessary since God cannot change his will. Thus God is not free “at this point” to
merely liberate a person from sin without satisfaction. In that sense, God does not “preserve”
his freedom with a “non-binding” requirement.
32

33

Stump, Aquinas, 431. This translation of ST III.46.2.ad3 appears to be Stump’s own.
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and befitting . . . let us also show that other possible means were not lacking
on God’s part, to whose power all things are equally subordinate.

Aquinas’s own answer (respondeo) steers a middle course between the
opening objections and this testimony from Augustine. Aquinas begins
his answer saying the following:
[I answer that:] A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two ways:
first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from supposition. Therefore,
speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind
otherwise than by the Passion of Christ. . . . Yet it was impossible if some
supposition be made.

With Aquinas’s “yes and no” answer in place, we see the importance of the
opening lines of Aquinas’s “reply to objection 3,” lines which Stump fails
to quote:
Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from
the human race. But if [God] had willed to free man from sin without any
satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice.34

With these words, Aquinas’s concedes the premise of the third objection:
God’s justice did require satisfaction. Yet the conclusion that Christ had to
die does not follow because “even this justice depends on the divine will.”
The suggestion is that Christ did not, “absolutely speaking,” have to die,
because justice did not, absolutely speaking, have to require satisfaction.
Justice is based on God’s will, the content of which, apparently, was not
itself necessary.
Aquinas’s talk of alternative possibilities as to what justice could require, and his talk of justice and its requirements “being based on the
divine will,” clearly draws on his discussion of divine free will in ST I.19.
There, Aquinas considers two kinds of things that God wills: viz., his own
goodness and things apart from himself. The former he wills necessarily,
but the latter he wills “in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness
as their end.”35 But “in willing an end,” Aquinas reasons, it is necessary
that we will some means only if that means is necessary to attaining the
end. Therefore, since God’s goodness “can exist without other things,” “it
follows that [God’s] willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely
necessary.”36 This conclusion is important because Aquinas explains later
in the question that “God has free will with respect to what He does not
necessarily will.” Thus, on Aquinas’s terms, the basis of his claim in ST
III.46.2 that Christ’s satisfaction was not “absolutely necessary” is that
God’s requirement of satisfaction is an act of divine free will. Cessario
appears correct when he observes that Aquinas’s claim “exhibits a shift in
theological interpretation. For Anselm . . . the thought of God forgiving
These words immediately precede the section of “reply to objection 3” quoted above.
ST I.19.3.
36
ST I.19.3.
34
35
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sin without punishment necessarily implies a disorder.”37 For Aquinas,
however, God requires satisfaction (to borrow the formula from ST 1.19.3)
neither by his nature, nor contrary to his nature, but rather, voluntarily.”38
While Aquinas maintains that satisfaction is not “absolutely” necessary
but instead was a matter of divine free will, nevertheless as ST I.19 and
ST III.46.1–2 explain, there is for Aquinas an important sense in which the
requirement of satisfaction for sin was and is necessary—namely, necessary
“by supposition.” “Supposing that God wills a thing, then He is unable
not to will it, as His will cannot change.”39 Supposing, then, that God has
willed to require satisfaction, which Aquinas indicates God has done (by
his “ordinance” for creation), then it is indeed necessary that satisfaction
be made.40 Hence, the opening lines of “reply to objection 3” are counterfactual in nature: “If [God] had willed to free man from sin without
satisfaction, he would not have acted against justice.” Aquinas in no way
suggests that “after” God’s ordinance for creation, he is “free to forego”
satisfaction. Thus, the text to which Stump points (ST III.46.2.ad3) does
not undermine Aquinas’s clear claims—not only in CT and SCG, but also
in the very article from which the cited passage is drawn—that divine
justice requires satisfaction; instead, the text notes that this requirement of
satisfaction by divine justice is something God freely willed.41
IV. Aquinas (and Anselm) on Justice, Satisfaction and Punishment
Stump was able to maintain that satisfaction had a purely remedial function because she first held that God did not require satisfaction. The same
logic holds for my account, only in reverse: my establishing that God does
require satisfaction in Aquinas’s account suggests that satisfaction has
more-than-remedial function in that account. Satisfaction somehow upholds the order of justice. Aquinas does not merely leave us to infer this
additional function of satisfaction; rather, he makes the point explicitly
in discussing the nature of penance in ST Supp 12.42 (This is particularly
interesting because Stump and Van Nieuwenhove appeal to satisfaction’s
being part of penance to suggest just the opposite, viz., that it has only a
remedial function.)

37

Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” 122.

ST I.19.3.ad3 “It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not
will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.”
38

39

ST I.19.3.

Aquinas speaks in ST III.46.2 of God’s “ordinance” as one of the things whose supposition implies necessity.
40

41
Stump’s error comes when she drops the counterfactual framework of ST III.46.ad3 and
concludes, “So, on Aquinas’s view, it is not necessary that satisfaction be made for human
sins” (Stump, Aquinas, 431; emphasis mine).
42
Though compiled after his death from earlier writings, the way that the account outlined in ST Supp. 12 coheres with Aquinas’s other writing tells in favor of the assumption
that its account of the aim of satisfaction represents Aquinas’s established views.
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In ST Supp 12, Aquinas considers the question, “Whether satisfaction
is an act of justice?” By reference to the nature of justice and of satisfaction, he quickly delivers the affirmative answer.43 In the remainder of the
article, Aquinas pursues a more detailed account of satisfaction’s relation
to justice. He notes first that satisfaction “expresses equality in the agent,”
and as such “denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to
another.”44 Then, noting that justice toward another can involve external
goods or merely actions, Aquinas specifies that satisfaction has to do
with actions, specifically with doing something that “equalizes” one’s past
unjust action.45 As such, a person’s making satisfaction presupposes that
that person had previously failed to act toward another in a just way. This
failure of justice is an “inequality” which “constitutes an offense; so that
satisfaction regards a previous offense.” He then immediately adds that
“no part of justice regards a previous offense, except vindictive justice.”
Implicitly anticipating an objection, he explains that the fact that satisfaction is self-imposed—that “the penitent holds to the penance”—is no
obstacle to satisfaction being an act of vindictive justice (iustitia vindicativa), “since vindictive justice establishes equality indifferently, whether
the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes
himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another
man.” He concludes that penance itself is “in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the
agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part
which is called penance.”
Importantly, when Aquinas speaks of vindictive justice, he speaks of
one being punished. The suggestion is that satisfaction involves (perhaps
among other things) voluntarily46 inflicting a punishment on oneself,
and that this undergoing of punishment establishes justice by equalizing
one’s prior offence. I will argue below that Aquinas elsewhere explicitly
endorses this suggestion, which we see only implicitly here. (Indeed, in
the subsequent article, ST Supp. 12.3, Aquinas speaks of satisfaction as
“the act of justice inflicting punishment”). But first it will be helpful to

43
He writes, “Justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing
according to a certain proportion;” and satisfaction, by its very name (“enough”), “denotes
an equality of proportion.” It follows that, formally, “satisfaction is an act of justice.”
44
In those elaborations (ST Supp.12.2), Aquinas explains that there are two kinds of acts of
justice: commutative and distributive (i.e., those where a person gives to another that which
is due the other, and those where a person, acting as a judge, establishes justice between two
others. Cf. ST II-II.61.1). In these two kinds of acts of justice, the justice, or new equality, is
“taken up” in different places: in the first, it is established in the agent; in the second, it is
established in the subject who has suffered injustice. Aquinas presents this observation to
explain why satisfaction is an act of commutative justice.
45
So, while we might think that the important part of satisfaction is the state in which the
goods are restored to the victim, Aquinas think that satisfaction properly concerns the act of
wrongdoer.
46
See below for a discussion of Aquinas’s explanation of how satisfactory punishment
can be voluntary, given that he sees punishment as involving an aspect of involuntariness.
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head off an objection to this interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of
satisfaction.
One might object to the interpretation of satisfaction I have suggested
(namely, that satisfaction involves voluntarily assuming punishments that
satisfy an order of justice) by arguing that the concept of satisfaction is
determined by Anselm (who first espoused the “satisfaction” theory of the
atonement) and that Anselm frames satisfaction as an alternative to punishment. Indeed, Anselm does frame satisfaction in this way. Anselm holds
that when a person wrongs God by “robbing God of his honor,” the justice
of the “order of things” over which God presides can be upheld either by
God punishing the wrongdoer, or by the wrongdoer (or someone else)
providing “satisfaction,” something which God considered sufficiently
good to compensate for the sin. Thus, for Anselm, divine justice requires
punishment or satisfaction—and satisfaction is clearly presented as an
alternative to punishment.47 If Aquinas’s account of satisfaction follows
Anselm’s, then there must be a mistake in the argument that Aquinas understands satisfaction as involving punishment.
The solution to this objection is to recognize that Aquinas’s conception of satisfaction differs from Anselm’s. Whereas Anselm conceives of
satisfaction and punishment as alternatives, holding that divine justice
requires one or the other, Aquinas conceives of satisfaction as involving punishment. As such, he holds throughout his writings (in SCG, ST, and CT)
that divine justice simply requires punishment.48 “Divine justice requires,
for the preservation of equality in things, that punishments [poenae] be assigned for faults; “the order of justice demands that a punishment [poena]
47
See Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, at, for example, I.13: “Necessarily, then, when God’s honor
is taken away [i.e., the essential feature of sin for Anselm], either it is paid back [which is
satisfaction] or else punishment follows.” He speaks of God enforcing a requirement of “either repayment or punishment.” Note also Millard Erickson’s remark that in the developing
medieval penitential system, one could “by rendering some form of satisfaction . . . avoid
punishment for one’s offenses. This was in keeping with a legal principle of the time: in
matters of private offense, various forms of satisfaction could be substituted for punishment”
(Erickson, Christian Theology, 814). Also, see Bruce McCormack, “Atonement.”
48
SCG III.142.5: “To the increase [either of good or bad] which depends on the number of
works there must be a corresponding increase in rewards and punishments; otherwise, there
would not be a compensation under divine justice for all the things that a person does, if some
evils remained unpunished and some goods unrewarded.”
SCG III.158.5: “If [a person] does not exact this penalty of himself, then, since things
subject to divine providence cannot remain disordered, this penalty will be inflicted on him
by God.”
ST I-II.77.ad1: “The Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue.”
ST I-II.87.3.ad3: “God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does
delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.”
ST I-II.91.4: “In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished
[impunitum], it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.”
CT 181, in a passage on why purgatory is needed: “The order of divine justice demands
that punishment be undergone for sins.”
Also, Bruce McCormack gives support for at least this general line of interpretation
relating Aquinas to Anselm. “That ‘satisfaction’ might occur through punishment did not
occur to Anselm, though it was basic to the thinking of a host of medieval and Reformation
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be assigned for a sin.”49 That God punishes all sin is part of his work, not
as a cosmic accountant, but as a governor. Aquinas writes, “The function of
punishing and rewarding belongs to him whose office it is to impose the
law. . . . But it belongs to divine providence to lay down the law for men.
. . . Therefore, it belongs to God to punish [punire] and reward men.”50
Punishing and rewarding are part of how God upholds this order.
How does punishing uphold the order? Aquinas holds that God maintains the good ordering of the world by subsuming breaches of that order,
i.e., evil acts, back under an aspect of good: “We observe that every evil
in things of nature is included under the order of something good. So,
the corruption of air is the generation of fire and the killing of a sheep
is the feeding of a wolf.”51 The good aspect under which God subsumes
human sin is that of punishment. While sin consists in a human choosing
to exercise her will her way—it is her pushing off or rejecting God’s ordering—punishment consists in God imposing God’s order back on
the sinner.52 The response of punishment creates a kind of appropriate
equality—in other words, justice, which is precisely the thing a governor
is responsible to maintain. So, SCG 140.5: “This inequity is removed
when, against his will, man is forced to suffer something in accord with
divine ordering. Therefore, it is necessary that human sins be given punishment [puniantur] of divine origin and, for the same reason, that good
deeds receive their reward.” Aquinas makes the same point in ST I-II.87.1:
“Whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the
principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that
whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put
down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment [poena].”
So, unlike Anselm, for whom God required satisfaction or punishment,
Aquinas states that divine justice requires punishment; and Aquinas
holds that undergoing punishment establishes justice in virtue of its being
an act which “equalizes” one’s past offence. This confirms the suggestion
of ST Supp. 12, that satisfaction, as an act of vindictive justice, involves one voluntarily performing an action that involves inflicting on one’s self a punishment
(for sin) that God, in his justice, requires. Moreover, Aquinas explicitly affirms
this understanding of satisfaction in SCG III.158.5:
After a man has secured remission of his sin by grace and has been brought
back to the state of grace, he remains under an obligation, as a result of
God’s justice, to some penalty [poenam] for the sin that he has committed.
Now, if he imposes this penalty on himself by his own will, he is said to
thinkers and represented a development whose importance [Gusaf] Aulén underestimated”
(McCormack, “Atonement”).
49

SCG III.142.1; SCG III.158.4

50

SCG III.140.2.

51

SCG III.140.5.

52

SCG III.140.5.
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make satisfaction to God by this: inasmuch as he attains with labor and punishment the divinely established order by punishing [puniendo] himself for
the sin, which order he had transgressed by sinning through following his
own will. But, if he does not exact this penalty of himself, then, since things
subject to divine providence cannot remain disordered, this penalty will be
inflicted on him by God. Such a punishment is not called one of satisfaction,
since it is not due to the choice of the one who suffers it.

This understanding of satisfaction as involving voluntarily undergoing
the punishment or penalty ( poena) required by justice explains why Aquinas
does not need to employ Anselm’s “either-punishment-or-satisfaction”
formula.
This interpretation of Aquinas on satisfaction might prompt the
following objection: how can satisfaction involve voluntarily inflicting punishment on oneself, given that, for Aquinas, “the nature of punishment is to
be against the will”?53 The question raises an important point, one which
shows that for Aquinas, there is a difference between “satisfaction” and
“punishment”—but the difference is not a matter of punishment. Aquinas
writes the following in ST I-II.87.6:
When punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although
satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary.
Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect.
(Italics mine)

On Aquinas’s view, divine justice requires either “punishment simply” or
“satisfactory punishment”—in either case, though, there is an imposition
of divine order against the sinner’s will which removes the “inequity” of
the sinful offence; in short, there is genuine punishment. And thus, we
see why Aquinas can say that divine justice simply requires punishment
for sin. Furthermore, understanding satisfaction as involving a voluntary
undergoing of punishments required by divine justice explains Aquinas’s
remark that the one who performs satisfaction makes, by their voluntary
choice, “a virtue out of a necessity”: one chooses to undergo the punishment
justice requires.54 Finally, as I will argue below, Aquinas understanding of
Christ’s satisfaction as bearing our punishment for us, in our place, provides yet further evidence for this reading of satisfaction.
On the basis of these texts, then, I suggest that Stump (and Van
Nieuwenhove) have rejected a function of satisfaction that Aquinas endorses: satisfaction aims and functions to uphold the order of divine justice,
which requires that sin be punished, and it upholds or “satisfies” this requirement of divine justice by undergoing the required punishment.
ST I-II.87.6
ST Supp.12.1. Aquinas’s exact wording is “makes a virtue of necessity.” Thus, satisfaction
involves an act which is somewhat contrary to one’s will, in a sense, but not to her actual
choice; whereas “simple” punishment is contrary to will and choice.
53
54
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V. Punishment: Penal or Remedial?
Like before, though, how do we explain the texts to which Stump and
others point? Specifically, what about Stump’s (and Van Nieuwenhove’s)
claim that the function of satisfaction is remedial, rather than penal? My
reply is simple: Aquinas does not pit the one function against the other.
Indeed, he writes, “Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.”55 And, regarding justice itself, “Justice aims not only at removing inequality already
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for
the future, because according to the Philosopher, punishments are medicinal.”56 Clearly, Aquinas sees two purposes for satisfaction: remedying
the sinner and penalizing them to establish an order of justice otherwise
infringed upon by their past sin.57
That these two purposes can be co-present seems plausible. Imagine
a medicine that is repugnant to take, but which made the one who took
it more obedient to one’s parents. After a fit of a child’s disobedience, a
parent might administer it to her child for both its effects. (On this illustration, satisfaction could consist in the child voluntarily choosing to take it
after a fit of disobedience). This seems to be precisely what Aquinas has
in mind. A penalty or punishment ( poena) is imposed upon us because it
is just; but that which is imposed on us is also for our good. In the simultaneously penal and remedial nature of the punishments of satisfaction,
we see God’s justice and his mercy operating in a unity, at one and the
same time. Interestingly, Aquinas holds that God’s “justice and mercy are
present in all God’s works.”58 Satisfaction’s remedial purpose need not
undermine its penal one.
We should consider one more objection, however. In SCG III.158,
Aquinas writes that one’s love for God and one’s remorse for sin may be
so strong that the need for “the punishments of satisfaction” is removed.59
Punishments are medicine that is “necessary so that the mind may adhere
more firmly to the good.”60 But sometimes, the mind is already so bonded
to God that the medicine—the undergoing of punishment by which one
makes satisfaction—is not needed. Thus, in this passage, Aquinas seems
to say that punishments are necessary only as a means to the end of the
restoration of one’s love, since on account of already possessing that end
(love for God), the means (punishment) is said to be not necessary. But if
punishments are necessary only as a means to the end of the restoration of
love, they are not necessary for justice’s sake.
ST Supp.13.2.
ST Supp.12.3
57
See also CT 121: “Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin, and
also to restore right order violated by the sin.”
58
ST I.21.4.
59
SCG III.158.6.
60
SCG III.158.6.
55
56
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But a close reading of the passage suggests otherwise. In the text,
Aquinas steadily utilizes a two-part structure (marked below with “[1]”
and “[2]”). He notes that punishment is necessary for two reasons. First,
so that “the mind may adhere more firmly to the good,” and second, “so
that the order of justice may be observed,” which happens by the sinner
“standing the penalty.” He then notes, first, that a strong love for God is
sufficient to direct one to the good, and second, that “displeasure for a past
fault, when intense, brings great sorrow.” “Consequently,” he writes (and
the inferential nature of the claim is important), “through [1] the strength
of one’s love for God, and [2] of one’s hatred of past sin, there is removed
the need for punishments of satisfaction.” The structure of the passage indicates not that satisfaction is forgone but that the intense sorrow over sin
is its own experience of a penal punishment for sin. It is on account of this
punishment that no other punishment is needed. And the already-present
love means that (further) punishment is also not needed for the sake of
remedy. Both purposes of the punishments of satisfaction can sometimes
be fulfilled in an affective realm. Here, too, then, satisfaction’s penal nature
and juridical function should not be undermined by reference to the remedial purpose of the punishments of satisfaction.
VI. Satisfaction in Christ’s Passion
So far, I have argued, first, that Aquinas holds that God’s justice (based
on God’s will) requires satisfaction for the remission of sin. Second, I
contended that satisfaction involves the voluntary undergoing of the
punishment ( poena) justice requires, and functions to uphold an order
of justice that requires that punishment be meted out. I noted how this
marks Aquinas off from Anselm (for whom satisfaction was an alternative to punishment), and that this penal purpose of satisfaction need not
compete with its remedial one, since Aquinas affirms them both. In this
penultimate section I will consider Aquinas’s understanding of Christ’s
death, in its work of making satisfaction for sin.
Note that much of the task of interpreting the nature of Christ’s death
as a work of satisfaction lies in discerning Aquinas’s understanding of the
nature of satisfaction. After all, to say that one of the functions of Christ’s
death is to make satisfaction for humanity’s sin obviously applies one’s
understanding of satisfaction to the atonement. As such, insofar as Christ’s
death does function as a work of satisfaction, and insofar as he does not
make satisfaction for his own sins, the argument above on the nature of satisfaction (Sections III–V) has already given substantial reason to think that
the efficacy of Christ’s death involves and draws on Christ undergoing a
punishment that justice requires, in order to satisfy that requirement for
us. Nonetheless, it is helpful to consider directly Aquinas understanding
of Christ’s death.
Given the account of the nature of satisfaction I offered above, one
would expect that in speaking of Christ’s atonement as a work of satisfaction, penalty or punishment, and substitution would be important
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concepts. One would expect Aquinas to say that one way Christ’s death
has salvific efficacy is in virtue of his taking upon himself the penalty or
punishments assigned by justice for our sins. And—despite Stump’s and
Van Nieuwenhove’s (and to some extent Cessario’s) claims—one finds exactly that in Aquinas.
In CT 231, Aquinas writes, “Christ wished to suffer not only death, but
also the other ills that flow from the sin of the first parent to his posterity,
so that, bearing in its entirety the penalty [poenam] of sin, He might perfectly
free us from sin by offering satisfaction.”61 Humanity incurred a penalty
for their sin; but Christ freed humanity from that penalty by bearing it for
them—and this was the content of his work of satisfaction.
In CT 227, Aquinas issues the same idea, invoking such legal language
as “sentence,” “charge,” “debt,” and “penalty”:
Christ willed to submit to death for our sins so that, in taking on Himself
without any fault of His own the punishment charged against us, He might
free us from the death to which we had been sentenced, in the way that
anyone would be freed from a debt of penalty if another person undertook
to pay the penalty for him.

The text clearly affirms a penal and substitutionary nature of the function
of Christ’s death, just in that there is one punishment or penalty due to humans, and Christ substitutes himself as the “payer” of that punishment.
Moreover, the text suggests that Christ did not just undergo the same kind
of experience as that due to humanity in consequence of their sin, but
that he took on himself humanity’s very punishment; he paid humans’
particular debt.
Also, CT 228:
Christ’s death was suitable as a salutary means of satisfaction. [For] Man is
fittingly punished in the things wherein he has sinned. . . . But the first sin of
man was the fact that he ate the fruit . . . , contrary to God’s command. In his
stead Christ permitted Himself to be fastened to a tree, so that He might pay
for what He did not carry off.62

Christ pays, as a substitute, the debt of punishment we owed; he bears our
punishment “in our stead;” he dies the death due to us.
It is not just in CT that Aquinas sees Christ as making satisfaction by
bearing in humanity’s place, as its substitute, the punishment for human
sin required by divine justice. He gives the same account in SCG IV.55.22:
Christ had to suffer death . . . to wash away the sins of others. This indeed
took place when He who was without sin willed to suffer the penalty [poenam] due to sin that He might take on Himself the penalty due to others, and
make satisfaction for others. And although the grace of God suffices by itself
for the remission of sins . . . nonetheless in the remission of sin something is
required on the part of him whose sin is remitted: namely, that he satisfy the
61

CT 231, emphasis mine.

62

Emphasis mine.
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one offended. And since other men were unable to do this for themselves,
Christ did this for all by suffering a voluntary death out of charity.

Whereas we owed God satisfaction in virtue of our debt of punishment,
Christ makes satisfaction for us, by “taking on Himself the penalty due to
others,” so those others, i.e., sinful humans, would not have to. I conclude,
then, that Stump’s third denial is incorrect: Aquinas does maintain that
one way Christ’s death functions is as a substitute bearer of a penalty or
punishment, even one required by divine justice.
VII. Aquinas and Penal Substitution Theory
I have argued that Aquinas maintains three positions, each of which
Stump takes Aquinas to deny: A1) that divine justice (based on the divine will) requires satisfaction; A2) that satisfaction involves undergoing
punishment in order to satisfy a requirement of divine justice that sin be
punished; and A3) that one way in which Christ’s death has saving effect
is that he bears the punishment required by justice for us, in our place,
thereby freeing us from the debt of punishment.
I wish now to consider one important implication of my argument, an
implication that concerns how Aquinas’s account relates to other accounts
of the atonement. Recall that Stump’s three claims (S1–S3) were presented
as key ways in which Aquinas’s account diverged from the popular account of the atonement. In defending the exact opposite of Stump’s three
claims, my interpretation suggests a much more positive relationship
between Aquinas and Stump’s popular account of the atonement—and
between Aquinas’s account and the account represented by the popular
account.
Consider the following 4-point account of the atonement, which also
captures the heart of Stump’s popular account:63
1) Divine justice requires “penalty” or “punishment” ( poena) for sin.
2) The fact that humans have sinned means that a “sentence,” “debt”
or “penalty” of punishment ( poena) accrues to them; the sinner incurs the obligation of seeing to it that the penalty is undergone.
3) Christ’s passion functions by way of his bearing humans’ punishment ( poena), for them, as their substitute.
4) This “bearing of punishment” is salvific for humanity in virtue of its
“exhausting” the requirement of punishment for sin. Humans do
not need to bear the required punishment because the requirement
was satisfied when the punishment was borne by the substitute.
As Sections III–VI attest, Aquinas, according to my argument, agrees
with all four points of this account (with the important qualification that
“this justice is based on the divine will”). While that itself is an important
63

Recall Stump’s description of the popular account given in footnote 1 above.
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correction to Stump’s account, we discern a further implication of the
reading defended here when we observe that (1)–(4) also forms a recognizably even if basic “penal substitution” account of the atonement. Of course,
one might object that PST holds that God punishes Jesus, and so we first
need to consider whether Aquinas’s talk of “Christ bearing our punishment” really amounts to talk of Christ being punished by God.64 While this
distinction is important, leaving it for another occasion does not prevent us
from saying that (1)–(4) itself merit being called a “basic PST.”65 Like PST,
(1)–(4) focuses on a requirement of divine justice for punishment; it sees a
plight facing sinful humanity in virtue of that requirement; and it understands Christ’ death in terms of substitution in fulfilling that requirement.
Thus, insofar as we take for granted the penal-substitutionary character of
(1)–(4), which it clearly appears to bear, my account of Aquinas on satisfaction suggest that, contra Stump’s interpretation, one part of Aquinas’s
multifaceted account of the atonement resembles a basic PST—and not just
“superficially.”
Conclusion
Stump’s exposition of Aquinas’s account of the atonement helpfully
conveys to a wider philosophical audience some of the non-juridical,
non-penal-substitutionary functions Aquinas ascribes to Christ’s death.
Yet in her exposition, Stump claims not merely that Aquinas goes beyond
a popular though philosophically embattled penal-substitution-style account of the atonement; she claims that Aquinas rejects (or at least does
not endorse) the account as such. I have argued that this further, negative
claim is incorrect. For Aquinas, divine justice does require satisfaction, albeit freely; satisfaction involves voluntarily undergoing punishment for
sin required by divine justice; and one way Christ’s death functions is by
his “bearing the punishment” required by justice for us, in our place, to
free us from our debt of punishment.66
Baylor University
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